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This volume contains papers and comments presented at the conference "Trade
Prospects Among the Americas: Latin-American Export Diversification and
the New Protectionism," which was held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 23-26 March
1980. The conference was cosponsored by the Fundagao Institute de Pesquisas
Economicas (FIPE) of the University of Sao Paulo, the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Bureau
of Economic and Business Research of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, with financial support from IBM World Trade Americas/Far
East Corporation and the Central Bank of Brazil. This was one in a series of
conferences on Latin-American economic issues that the NBER, with IBM
support, has helped organize. The conference was organized by Malcolm Gillis,
Institute Fellow at the Harvard Institute for International Development and
representative for NBER, and Carlos Longo, and the proceedings were edited
by Werner Baer and Malcolm Gillis.
The principal focus of the conference was upon trade relations between
Latin America and the advanced industrial countries, particularly the United
States. But in addition, opportunities for and constraints upon intra-Latin-
American trade were examined. The time horizon of the discussion extended
beyond current questions to problems likely to be of significant concern for
the rest of the decade of the 1980s. Some of the papers in this volume are pri-
marily empirical in character, others focus upon theoretical considerations.
The editors expect that the papers included in this volume will be of sub-
stantial interest to a variety of constituencies, ranging from trade and Latin-
American area specialists in academia, to public officials in both North and
South America, and to that part of the business community concerned with
hemispheric trade and development issues.10 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
AN OVERVIEW
In the past decade, there has been a palpable shift in trade policies within
most Latin-American countries toward greater reliance on export-led growth.
For a long period, Latin-American countries pursued import-substitution in-
dustrialization policies, in many cases closely geared to autarkic goals. Begin-
ning in the 1960s, policymakers in most of the nations in the region, particu-
larly the larger ones, began to view such inward-looking strategies with growing
reservations, as the contradictions inherent in this approach became steadily
more evident. One of the major contradictions was, of course, that policies of
vigorous import substitution often led ultimately to more, not less, national
vulnerability to shocks and cycles generated in the world economy. Further,
inward-looking strategies involving heavy use of capital (the relatively scarce
factor of production) did not, by and large, yield the gains in employment and
distributional equity foreseen by early proponents (both within and outside
Latin America) of import substitution. In addition, the vestiges of inward-
looking approaches led to persistent deficits financed by external borrowing
and, occasionally, to the threat of default. Often the process culminated in
loss of considerable degrees of freedom in the conduct of national economic
and social policy.
However, the legacy of the import-substitution era was not by any means
wholly unfavorable. In particular, the learning process inherent in the import
substitution experience proved useful, as several countries gained valuable pro-
duction experience essential for competing in world markets. This considera-
tion, together with the growth limitations imposed by the size of internal mar-
kets, suggests that further shifts toward a more trade-oriented development
strategy may be both feasible and desirable, as some countries in the region
have already begun to demonstrate. One other consideration strongly indicates
that such a shift will be indispensable: the very rapid recent growth of external
debt among countries in the region. The servicing and amortization of very
large debt obligations will eventually require sustained growth in export earn-
ings if income growth is to proceed without severe dislocations, and at a pace
required to meet basic social goals of Latin-American societies. In recent years,
rates of income growth in Latin America have slackened considerably from
those recorded from 1966-75. During this decade of peak growth performances
for the region, total GNP increased at an average annual rate of 6.4 percent,
as reported by the World Bank. But regional income growth declined to 4.7
percent in 1977 and to only 3.9 percent in 1978 [1]. Although rates of growth
as high as those experienced from 1966-75 will not guarantee that many Latin-
American countries will be successful in dealing with major social problems of
income distribution, employment, and disease, growth at rates as low as those
observed since 1975 offers even more limited opportunities for resolving such
problems. Provision of conditions necessary for expanded and diversified exportPREFACE 11
earnings is, therefore, in the mutual interest of both Latin-American and capi-
tal-exporting nations.
The external debt issue is a matter of both immediate and longer-term con-
cern to both constituencies. Recent developments in Latin-American borrowing,
coupled with palpable resurgence of protectionist sentiment in the countries of
the industrial North and the large jump in world energy prices in 1979 provide
ample basis for the pessimistic forecasts of growth in the region. That the debt
of Latin-American countries (exclusive of softer-term official transfers) has
been increasingly rapid in recent years is well known. The approximate dimen-
sions of this growth are less widely perceived. During 1974, total new external
debt obligations of Latin-American countries contracted in international pri-
vate capital markets was recorded by the World Bank at $4.4 billion [2]. For
the year 1977, such market-term obligations (including foreign and interna-
tional bonds as well as publicized Eurocurrency credits) increased by $11.7
billion, a figure which probably significantly understates actual growth, since
many large Eurocurrency credits are not publicized. Of the latter amount,
Mexico and Brazil together accounted for nearly two-thirds. If growth in ex-
ternal debt of Latin-American countries proceeded throughout 1978 at the
same pace as in the third quarter of that year, total new obligations on market-
term debt contracted in 1978 would have grown by nearly $18.0 billion, which
is more than four times 1974 borrowings. These numbers imply compound
annual growth of more than 40 percent per annum, a rate far in excess of
the growth in gross export earning, not to mention growth of current account
surpluses, in the region. The heavy Latin-American borrowings in the past
four years, coupled with debt outstanding prior to 1974, had by early 1979
resulted in a stock of private external debt of a size few would have predicted
in the early 1970s. By mid-1978, Brazil alone owed no less than $25 billion in
private loans (out of a total of $37 billion in total external obligations). By the
end of 1979, the Brazilian finance minister was reported to have placed that
country's total external debt as close to $50 billion, at a time when Brazil was
still trying to digest a more than 100 percent increase in prices of imported
oil.
1 Finally, such poorer countries as Peru and Bolivia were faced with severe
problems in coping with external debt obligations in excess of $5 billion, in
the former case, and perhaps half that in much smaller Bolivia.
Clearly expansion and diversification of exports from Latin-American coun-
tries will be essential if large de facto defaults of the types experienced in 1979
by Turkey and Zaire are to be avoided in the 1980s. The question is whether
world markets will permit sufficient scope for the requisite expansion and diver-
sification, and whether Latin-American economies can be reoriented rapidly
enough to make this possible, export markets permitting.
It is possible that the experiences of a small group of Asian nations from
1960-78 may be of some relevance for many Latin-American nations that have12 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
already begun to reorient trade strategies. The economic performances of
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore had been widely extolled by West-
ern observers even well prior to 1977, before Jagdish Bhagwati first applied to
them the sobriquet "Gang of Four." Clearly, all of these nations belong in any
list of "superexporters" of the 20th century.
That the export experience of these countries has been little short of phe-
nomenal is not in question. Indeed, in 1976, each one of the Asian super-
exporters had manufactured exports that exceeded the sum total of manu-
factured exports of all Latin-American countries together [4]. However, the
relevance for other nations of the experience of the "Gang of Four" for other
countries is often debated. For example, it is typically argued that Singapore
and Hong Kong represent the most unusual of special cases, given the "un-
typically small" populations of both city-states. Further, it is often claimed that
the experiences of both Korea and Taiwan furnish little basis for useful gen-
eralizations, because in both cases perceived dangers from potential aggression
have allowed tight military control of otherwise fractious societies, so that
development could proceed in an atmosphere of political stability. There may
be something to be said for these views.
In addition, there appear to have been significant differences in the earlier
strategies of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) followed by the super-
exporters on the one hand and the larger Latin-American countries on the
other. Latin American-ISI investments in manufacturing were aimed at the
large, protected internal markets, especially in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.
Whether with early emphasis on exports multinationals would have initially
entered manufacturing sectors in the region in the same massive way is un-
knowable. But when countries in the region did begin to shift toward export
diversification, the multinationals already had substantial excess capacity from
large investments made during the ISI stage; it became feasible for policy-
makers to reorient foreign and domestic firms toward the external market.
There are, therefore, a number of reasons why the experiences of the Asian
superexporters may be of rather limited relevance to Latin America. Neverthe-
less, it may be no less appropriate to seek useful generalizations on development
and trade from the experiences of relatively small Singapore and Hong Kong
more than from such untypically large nations as India or Indonesia, both of
which have furnished ample grist for the economist's mill. In any case, Hong
Kong and Singapore are not that small, in terms of population. Of the 92
LDCs listed in the World Bank's 1979 World Development Report, 25 are
smaller than Hong Kong (with 4.5 million) and 11 are smaller than Singa-
pore; and surely military-dominated governments in much larger Korea and
Taiwan have a large number of counterparts in the world, including Latin
America.
Finally, the nature of ISI in both Korea and Taiwan may not have been
that different from that of the larger Latin-American countries. To be sure,PREFACE 13
the relative importance of foreign direct investment in manufacturing was
much smaller in Taiwan and Korea, particularly the latter. But in both Asian
countries development efforts prior to the mid-1960s were strongly geared to
import substitution, and the initial spurt in the rapid transformation to export-
led development in both countries in the late 1960s was made possible by sub-
stantial excess capacity in industries originally established for import substitu-
tion purposes.
One major generalization that does seem of some relevance to would-be
superexporters in Latin America is that robust expansion of manufactured
exports from LDCs depends upon more than "getting the prices right." While
the influence of incentives flowing from reforms involving major adjustments
in basic macro prices (exchange rates, interest rates, energy prices, and so on)
is generally adjudged to have been a necessary condition for the successful
export drives of each of the Asia superexporters, nonprice factors may have
been no less important. Such "nonprice" factors as appeared to have been
operative in the Asian countries include extensive market research, readiness to
accept and implement marketing innovations developed elsewhere when ad-
visable (and to foster indigenous innovations when necessary), heavy emphasis
on quality control, timely delivery, augmentation and modernization of port
facilities, removal of impediments (such as lengthy customs procedures) of
access to imported raw materials incorporated into export, and superior deploy-
ment of organizational skills.
David Morawetz [3], among others, views failure to confront these nonprice
factors as an important part of the explanation for the low share of Latin-
American countries in world markets for manufactured exports. Problems in
marketing, quality control, punctuality of delivery, port procedures, and low
worker productivity have not been widely perceived, much less adequately
resolved. Until such barriers are sufficiently eroded, prospects for rapid export
growth are not bright, particularly since nonprice factors tend to become stead-
ily more important as Latin-American countries begin to move away from the
export of standardized products such as yarn and semiprocessed foodstuffs and
into more sophisticated, nonstandardized lines such as garments geared to
fashion, specialized capital goods, and more fully processed foodstuffs.
Expansion of Latin-American exports may encounter other difficulties as
well. Part of any growth of Latin-American exports would have to come at
the expense of the Asian "superexporters," not noted for passivity in the face
of threats to their export markets. In addition, there is now the prospect of
reentry of two poorer but populous Asian countries, China and Indonesia, into
a variety of markets for processed natural resources and manufactured exports.
Although part of the needed growth may be absorbed through intra-Latin-
American trade, a still larger part will challenge European capacities to trans-
form, and the remainder will pose additional adjustment problems for the
US economy.14 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
The conference approached the range of associated issues sketched herein
from several perspectives. The comprehensive paper by Donald B. Keesing
provides a critical appraisal of past Latin-American development policies with
regard to their impact on the region's position in the international economy;
he also provides alternative international scenarios within which Latin-Amer-
ica's export growth may take place. Keesing feels that Latin-America's export
performance was weak because policies were biased against them, especially
nontraditional exports. The principal remedy offered is strong emphasis on
policies which could set the prices right, that is, making the export sector more
competitive.
A number of contributions deal with the region's primary exports. F. G.
Adams, J. R. Behrman, and M. Lasaga, examine UNCTAD-types of price
stabilization programs for nonfuel primary products. They conclude that these
are not likely to solve Latin-America's trade problems. Comparing the gains
with the costs, the net positive impact is found to be very slight. Of more gen-
eral interest, they present an integrated econometric model designed to explore
the impact of the commodity problem on goal attainment in one particular
country, using copper in Chile as a case study. Raymond Vernon considers
the role of Latin-American state enterprises as exporters, especially of such
primary materials as oil and iron ore. He reviews their advantages over the
domestic private sector in gaining access to markets and in international bar-
gaining, and also considers their drawbacks in establishing production facilities
abroad. He also distinguishes between prospects for two types of state-enter-
prise-manufactured exports: standardized and unstandardized products. Among
his conclusions are that the former type of export, particularly processed raw
materials, faces a volatile and uncertain market, and that efforts to expand
the second type of export may succeed if state enterprises are given enough
freedom to develop arrangements that allow them to be more firmly linked
to markets in importing countries.
One paper deals with agricultural exports. Adolfo Figueroa presents an
analysis linking increased income concentration and "derived rural income."
He finds that the latter tends to decline as income becomes more concentrated.
The situation of the rural sector is worsened even more, he maintains, by the
decline of Latin-America's share of world trade in agricultural products and
by the growth of food imports for the urban sector. Thus the countries have
lost ground where they supposedly should have a comparative advantage —
food products. As a consequence the agricultural sector's role in Latin America
seems to be changing. Instead of providing both foreign exchange and cheap
food, the emphasis is increasingly on the former. The role of traditional agri-
culture has, therefore, been largely reduced to the maintenance of a cheap
rural labor force, some of which eventually migrates to the cities.
A paper by Abel Beltran del Rio focuses on a country "blessed" with oil —
Mexico. He begins by contrasting the recent Mexican experience in copingPREFACE 15
with a surge in oil export revenues with that of several countries in the Persian
gulf. Beltran del Rio identifies both the benefits and costs that may be derived
from oil windfalls. The nature of the former is fairly obvious; the latter includes
structural imbalances resulting from too rapid growth by too many sectors
simultaneously. In particular, inflationary pressures prove difficult to contain.
Finally, he examines likely oil policies in Mexico through 1990 and traces
their effects on major macro magnitudes.
Two authors consider policy reactions to external shocks. Bela Balassa deals
with the reaction of three Latin-American countries to the shocks of the mid-
1970s. He finds that Brazil maintained a rapid growth rate in the face of an
adverse balance of payments and still promoted further import substitution;
this resulted in accelerated inflation and increased foreign indebtedness. In
Mexico the internal shock of an overambitious public expenditure program
dominated the external shock, resulting in unsustainable balance of payments
deficits and considerable socioeconomic unrest. Uruguay, Balassa maintains,
used the impact of the external shock to reform the country's incentive system,
leading to rapid export growth and expansion.
A paper by Eliana A. Cardoso examines external disequilibrium in Brazil
over the 30-year period 1950-79. She contrasts the Brazilian experience with
many devaluations over most of that period with the results of the "maxi-
devaluation" of late 1979. Her analysis of the burden of exchange rate ad-
justments throws doubts on the effectiveness of the latter in dealing with the
balance of payments deficit due to strong internal cost responses. She argues
that devaluation can improve the trade balance in the short run at the cost
of a reduction in the real wage of unskilled labor, as long as unskilled can
substitute for skilled labor. She demonstrates this through the use of a model
where an imported intermediate good is used for production of a good that
is consumed at home and abroad.
A contribution by Miguel Urrutia deals with Colombia's participation in
the Andean Group since the inception of that organization in the late 1960s.
Colombia is widely perceived, both within and outside the Andean Group, as
both a prime beneficiary of expanded intra-Andean trade and a principal
supporter of the group's economic objectives. Urrutia argues that neither per-
ception is valid: Colombia has derived only marginal trade benefits from the
Andean Pact, and has remained as a member primarily for political rather
than economic reasons. He also furnishes an insider's view of how internal
decision processes in Colombia have governed the nature of the country's in-
volvement in the Andean Group over the decade of the 1970s.
Gustav Ranis's paper compares the development and trade strategies of
East Asian superexporters and Latin-American countries. As in other previous
articles by Ranis, emphasis is placed on the important distinction between
"export promotion" programs characteristic of much of Latin America, and
"export substitution" as typified by policies followed by Korea, Taiwan, Singa-16 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
pore, and Hong Kong since the mid-1970s. Export promotion involves the
selective encouragement of particular industries, featuring ad hoc measures
undertaken in the absence of general changes in the structure of policies affect-
ing trade. Export promotion is, therefore, best viewed as an effort involving
grafting of still more controls onto an elaborate latticework of policies required
to effectuate import substitution. By contrast, export substitution requires fun-
damental policy changes, not least of which is the dismantling of most of the
policy superstructure built up under the drive for import substitution, and
employs a strategy of general, as opposed to selective, reorientation of produc-
tion. Few Latin-American countries opted for this path in the 1970s.
Two papers discuss the reaction of developed countries to Latin-America's
export drive. Rachel McCulloch focuses on the implementation of the General
System of Preferences (GSP), the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, and the growth of protectionist pressures in industrial countries. She
shows that neither preferential access under GSP nor lower tariff barriers has
been a major force in explaining the growth of the region's exports. Rather,
the most important determinant is the business cycle of industrial countries.
Her analysis also leads to the conclusion that Latin America would benefit
more from MFN (most favored nation) trade concessions than from preferen-
tial trade agreements. Finally, Latin-American countries (and those of the
LDG world in general), which have in the past been passive beneficiaries
of trade concessions, would benefit from more aggressive collective trade nego-
tiations in which they would offer their own reciprocal concessions.
J. N. Finger analyzes recent US responses to dumping by foreign private
firms and to subsidies to exports by foreign governments. Both are examples of
less than fair value (LFV) mechanisms. Among various findings, Finger notes
that LFV complaints were filed against a significantly lower proportion of US
imports from Latin America than from developed countries. He also provides
insights into the types of strategies that developing countries in general, and
Latin-American countries in particular, might employ in order to exercise
more influence on the outcome of LFV complaints.
The final paper by Millard Long focuses on the rapid buildup of external
indebtedness of Latin-American countries in the period 1972-80. He first
traces both the reasons for growth in the debt, and difficulties in devising
appropriate ways for measuring it. He then utilizes a simple model to explore
future debt growth under various scenarios. In addition, Long raises a number
of methodological issues and argues that tools used by economists for analyzing
the external debt have lagged well behind developments in the increasingly
important market for debt.PREFACE 17
NOTES
* Many of the basic ideas reflected in this overview are due to an early draft of a
conference prospectus by both Rudiger Dornbusch of MIT and Carlos Diaz Alejandro
at Yale. Further valuable comments were supplied by Gerald Adams at Pennsylvania,
Rachel McCullough at Wisconsin, and Charles E. McLure, Jr., at NBER. None of these
people however, should share in the blame for any defects in our ultimate interpreta-
tions of their ideas and comments. Special thanks go to Dean Vernon K. Zimmerman
of the College of Commerce and Business Administration of the University of Illinois
for his extraordinary support of this publication.
1. These figures refer to 1976. See [3].
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